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Abstract 
 
In this chapter we examine trends in China’s household incomes, income distribution and 
inequality for China as a whole and for each of the urban, rural and rural-urban migrant 
subgroups, as well as analyzing changes in the income gaps between the urban and rural 
sectors and among the Eastern/Central/Western regions using the CHIP 2007 and 2013 
data.  Our base estimates show a decline in national inequality from 2007 to 2013.  
This decline is robust to alternative income definitions and different inequality indexes.  
The decline reflects reductions in important dimensions of inequality including the 
rural-urban income gap, regional income gaps, and inequality in the distribution of the 
major components of household income, e.g. wage earnings, asset income, etc.  The 
decline in national inequality would have been even larger if not for rising inequality 
within the urban and rural sectors and the growing importance of unequally distributed 
income components, such as income from assets and imputed rents on owner-occupied 
housing.  Moreover, the decline in national inequality is not robust to adjustments to 
correct for spatial differences in the cost of living and for under-representation of 
top-income groups in the survey sample.  These adjustments reveal that some, if not all, 
of the apparent reduction in inequality from 2007 to 2013 is due to changes in prices and 
the growing importance of top-income individuals and their incomes that are not captured 
in the household surveys.  The chapter contains further, detailed analyses of changes in 
incomes and income distribution within each of the urban, rural and migrant population 
subgroups. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
China’s economic reforms and its transformation from a planned to a market-based 
economy have now been ongoing for almost four decades.  During these decades China 
has experienced rapid economic growth, substantial structural change, and rising 
standards of living, as well as rising income inequality.  During the early decades of 
reform, rising inequality was considered an inevitable and acceptable consequence of the 
economic reforms.  As markets replaced planning, income differentiation based on 
supply, demand, and productivity emerged, and they provided positive incentives for 
work, investment and entrepreneurship.  Despite the rise in inequality, moreover, the 
benefits of rapid growth were widely shared. 
By the early 2000s, however, income inequality had reached a level that many viewed 
as worrisome.  In the early 2000s China’s Gini coefficient reached 0.45, a moderately 
high level by international standards (Li, Sato, and Sicular 2013; NBS 2013).  In 
response, in the early 2000s China’s new leaders, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, announced a 
change in policy emphasis, and China embarked on a multi-pronged policy program to 
counteract the rising inequality and to create a universal social safety net.  Nevertheless, 
inequality continued to rise such that by 2007 China’s Gini coefficient approached 0.5 (Li, 
Sato, and Sicular 2013; NBS 2013). 
Since 2008 inequality in China appears to have taken a new direction.  According to 
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official National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) estimates, the Gini coefficient peaked at 0.49 
in 2008‒09 and then progressively declined to 0.46 in 2015, still moderately high by 
international standards but returning to the level of inequality observed in China in the 
early 2000s (NBS 2013; NBS 2016).  These latest figures suggest that inequality in 
China may have turned a corner.   
In this chapter we take a close, hard look at the recent decline in inequality using data 
from the CHIP 2007 and 2013 surveys.  The detailed, household-level data in the CHIP 
surveys allow us to evaluate the official estimates in comparison to alternative, 
independent estimates and permit detailed analysis of the factors underlying the recent 
turnaround in inequality.   
Our central estimates of inequality based on the CHIP data confirm the decline in 
national inequality from 2007 to 2013.  Using the CHIP data, we calculate alternative 
measures of household income that adjust for deficiencies in the official income variable 
provided by the NBS, and we find the decline in inequality for the alternative income 
measures is somewhat larger than that for the official income statistics.  The decline is 
also robust to alternative measures of inequality.    
Disaggregating among subgroups and sources of income, we find that the decline in 
inequality reflects underlying changes in many important dimensions of China’s income 
distribution.  First, from 2007 to 2013 the urban-rural income gap narrowed, a 
noticeable change from the past when a secular widening of the urban-rural income gap 
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had contributed to rising national inequality.  The narrowing of the urban-rural gap from 
2007 to 2013 was the result of rapid growth in rural incomes.  Urban incomes also grew 
but not as quickly.  Within the urban and rural sectors, however, income inequality 
increased. 
Second, regional income gaps narrowed, the result of relatively rapid income growth 
in the Center and West regions of the country.  This was a continuation of the past 
catch-up among regions and suggests that increased mobility of both people and jobs in 
China were having an effect.  Income growth was especially rapid in the West, where by 
2013 average income had basically caught up to that in the Center.  Within the regions 
inequality also declined. 
Third, inequality declined not only for total household income but also for all its 
major components—wage earnings, income from agriculture and non-agricultural 
household businesses, asset income, pensions, and imputed rents on owner-occupied 
housing.  However, the declines in inequality for the individual income components 
were partially offset by rapid growth in those income components that are unequally 
distributed, such as asset income and imputed rents on owner-occupied housing.   
Although our core estimates of inequality show that inequality declined from 2007 to 
2013, adjustments to correct for spatial differences in the cost of living reduce the 
magnitude of the decline.  Furthermore, the decline disappears entirely—in fact, 
inequality increases rather than declines—when we adjust the estimates to correct for the 
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under-representation of the top-income groups in the survey data.  These adjustments 
are based on some strong assumptions, and the results are sensitive to those assumptions.  
Nevertheless, they raise the possibility that recent trends in inequality are in part due to 
differential changes in prices rather than changes in real incomes, and that the increasing 
under-representation of the very rich in the household survey data is an important source 
of a bias.  
We begin in Section II with data and measurement issues.  Here we describe the data, 
discuss the weaknesses of the NBS income variable, and explain how we construct our 
alternative CHIP income variable.  Section III presents our core estimates of income and 
inequality, paying attention to changes in the composition and distribution of different 
sources of income and across poorer, middle, and richer subgroups of the population.  
Section III also reports estimates of inequality adjusted for spatial price differences.  
Sections IV, V and VI examine incomes and inequality separately for formal urban 
residents, rural-to-urban migrants, and rural residents.  Section VII reports changes in 
the urban-rural and the regional income gaps and examines the implications for national 
inequality.   
In Section VIII we present alternate estimates of inequality that adjust for the 
under-representation of the top incomes in the CHIP survey data.  We use a standard 
methodology based on the assumption that the distribution of income for the top-income 
group takes the shape of a Pareto distribution and can be estimated using public 
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information on extremely rich individuals.  We conclude in Section IX with some 
reflections on the implications of our findings for policy and future research.        
                             
II. Data, Weights, and Income Definition 
 
In our analysis, we use the 2007 and 2013 CHIP household survey data.  The 2007 CHIP 
dataset consists of three separate samples for urban, rural, and migrant households 
respectively.  The 2007 urban and rural samples each cover fifteen provinces and were 
drawn from the NBS urban and rural household survey samples, which are known to 
under-represent rural-urban migrants.  To address this shortcoming of the NBS samples, 
the CHIP conducted an independent survey of rural-urban migrants.  The CHIP 2007 
migrant survey covers nine provinces of China with the largest migrant inflows and 
outflows.  Details on the CHIP 2007 migrant sample can be found in Li, Sato, and 
Sicular (2013) and Luo et al. (2013).  For our analyses of national income and inequality, 
we combine the 2007 urban, rural and migrant samples using population weights (to be 
discussed below).   
In late 2012 the NBS adopted a new, unified sampling frame that covers all 
households nationwide, including rural, urban, and migrant households.  The CHIP 2013 
sample is drawn from the unified NBS 2013 sample and consequently the CHIP 2013 
dataset differs from the previous CHIP datasets in that it is no longer comprised of 
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separate urban, rural, and migrant samples.  To maintain consistency with the 2007 
CHIP survey and to allow separate analysis by population subgroup, individuals in the 
2013 CHIP survey are classified as urban, rural, and migrant based on place of household 
registration (hukou) and actual location of residence in line with the classification criteria 
used by the NBS (see Chapter 1).       
[Table 2.1 about here] 
Table 2.1 shows the sample sizes and provincial coverage of the 2007 and 2013 
CHIP surveys.  The sample provinces were selected deliberately to include provinces in 
each of China’s Eastern, Central and Western regions so that the samples would reflect 
the nationwide economic conditions.  To the extent possible, the CHIP selected 
provinces for the 2013 survey that were consistent with those in the 2007 survey so as to 
facilitate comparison across the two years. 
[Table 2.2 about here] 
The sectoral and regional distributions of the CHIP 2007 and 2013 samples are not 
entirely consistent with those of China’s population, as reflected in the national census 
and annual population sample surveys.  To make the CHIP samples consistent with the 
national population data, we use two-level region (Eastern, Central, and Western) times 
sector (rural, urban, and migrant) sampling weights. For sectoral (rural, urban, migrant) 
analyses, we use regional weights, and for regional (Eastern, Central, and Western) 
analyses we use sectoral weights. After applying weights, the sectoral and regional 
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compositions of the CHIP sample are consistent with those in China’s population census 
and annual population sample surveys (Table 2.2). 
A major aim of the CHIP is to provide a basis for estimating China’s income levels 
and inequality in a way that is consistent over time and in line with international income 
measurement practices.  Most of the income data in the CHIP 2007 and 2013 surveys 
are provided by the NBS, which collects income and expenditure data in its annual 
household surveys by means of daily household income and expenditure diaries.  Using 
the information from these diaries, the NBS constructs estimates of household income 
and its components.  In this regard, the NBS (and thus the CHIP) income variables differ 
from the estimates of income in many other Chinese household survey datasets that rely 
on recall by the respondents.1   
The NBS income estimates are reasonably good measures of household income and 
are widely used by researchers.  They are, however, inconsistent over time, and they do 
not follow international practices of income measurement.  The CHIP has constructed 
                                                             
1 Examples of surveys using recall-based income variables are the China Household Finance 
Survey and the China Family Panel Study. Collecting household income data using respondent 
recalls has some disadvantages; for example, the respondents’ understanding of the concept of 
income may differ from that of the researchers, the income information provided by the 
respondents cannot easily be double-checked or verified, and the respondents may forget or 
overlook some income items.  Problems with the recall method are likely to be greatest among 
rural incomes due to the relatively large amount of self-production and in-kind income, which 
respondents may not consider to be income or which they may value at differing and inconsistent 
prices, and among income from household businesses.  The NBS collects income-related data 
using the diary method. Households record quantities and values of income and expenditures on a 
daily basis. The NBS checks the diary entries for consistency and uses the diary entries to 
calculate total, cash, and in-kind incomes as well as the income components using consistent 
definitions. Of course, the diary method also has shortcomings; for example, diary entries may 
not be complete or accurate, and completing the diaries requires effort, so some households may 
not complete the diaries regularly or may decline to participate in the survey.     
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alternative estimates of income for past rounds of the CHIP survey as well as for CHIP 
2013 to address these problems. We use the CHIP alternative estimates of income for the 
2007 and 2013 surveys in our analysis.   
First, the CHIP has adjusted the NBS income variable to make it consistent between 
2007 and 2013.  Between 2007 and 2013 the NBS changed its definition of household 
income and modified the classification of some income items among the different 
components of income.  Consequently, the 2007 and 2013 NBS income variables are not 
consistent.  To the extent possible given the information available in the CHIP 2007 and 
2013 datasets, the CHIP has adjusted the 2007 NBS income to match the 2013 definition.  
For one or two items, the necessary data are not available for 2007, so the 2013 NBS 
income variable is modified.  In addition, the CHIP has corrected some errors in the 
2013 NBS income variable.  Hereafter we refer to the original, unadjusted NBS income 
variable as “NBS income” and the adjusted NBS income variable as “adjusted NBS 
income.”  A summary of these adjustments is provided in Chapter 1.     
Second, aspects of the NBS income definition do not follow international practices.  
For 2007 and 2013 the major difference between the NBS income definition and 
international practices is the treatment of imputed rents on owner-occupied housing.  
International guidelines call for the inclusion of imputed rents on owner-occupied 
housing in household income.  In 2007 NBS income did not include imputed rents.  In 
2013 the NBS included an estimate of imputed rents, but the estimation method was 
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inconsistent with standard practices.   
The CHIP has estimated imputed rents following standard methods using information 
in the CHIP dataset.  For urban (including migrant) homeowner households, imputed 
rents are equal to the expected market rent for the dwelling, as self-reported by the 
households.  For rural homeowner households, imputed rents are set equal to the 
self-reported value of the dwelling multiplied by the rate of return on a long-term, safe 
asset.2  For both 2007 and 2013, the CHIP’s estimate of imputed rents is added to 
income.  For 2013, we subtract the NBS’s estimate of imputed rents.   
NBS income also does not include the value of certain implicit subsidies associated 
with subsidized or in-kind income. Treatment of such implicit subsidies in the 
measurement of income is a complex issue and beyond the scope of this analysis.  
Nevertheless, the CHIP has constructed estimates for one such subsidy that historically 
has been important in China.  For 2002 and 2007 rental housing subsidies for urban 
households that rent are estimated by comparing the actual rent paid to the predicted rent. 
Predicted rent is based on the results of a multivariate hedonic regression analysis using 
data for urban renter households that controls for housing characteristics and location of 
residence.  In cases where the actual rent paid by a household is less than the predicted 
rent based on the regression estimates, the housing subsidy is set equal to the difference 
between the predicted and the actual rent values.   
                                                             
2 Details on the CHIP’s estimation of imputed rents can be found in a note by Yue and Sicular 
(2016).  The rate of return used to estimate rural imputed rents is the interest rate on thirty-year 
government bonds, which in 2007 was 4.27 percent and in 2013 it was 4.90 percent.     
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Using these estimates of imputed rents on owner-occupied housing and implicit 
subsidies on rented housing, the CHIP has constructed a second measure of income that 
we refer to as “CHIP income.” CHIP income is equal to the adjusted NBS income plus 
the estimates of the imputed rents on owner-occupied housing and urban rental housing 
subsidies.  By 2007 and 2013 the amount of urban rental subsidies was small (increasing 
average urban incomes by less than 1 percent in both years), so the overwhelming 
majority of the difference between CHIP income and adjusted NBS income is due to the 
imputed rents.  
CHIP income is our preferred measure of income, and we use it for most of the 
analyses reported below.  To permit comparisons, for some results we also report 
estimates using NBS and adjusted NBS income.  
    
III. National Income Inequality 
 
Table 2.3 reports our estimates calculated using the CHIP survey data of mean incomes 
and income inequality for China as a whole in 2007 and 2013.  Estimates are shown for 
NBS income, adjusted NBS income, and CHIP income.  All estimates include the rural, 
urban, and migrant samples, which are combined using the population weights.  Mean 
incomes are in current year prices; percentage changes are in constant prices.  Income 
inequality is measured using the Gini coefficient, the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD), 
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and the Theil index.   
[Table 2.3 about here] 
Mean incomes and inequality differ somewhat depending on the income definition; 
however, in all cases mean income increased and inequality decreased from 2007 to 2013.  
For example, CHIP income per capita increased 61 percent from 2007 to 2013, equivalent 
to average annual growth of 8 percent over these years.  This rate of growth is rapid by 
international standards, although it represents a slowdown relative to the period between 
the 2002 and 2007 CHIP surveys, when CHIP income per capita grew at an average 
annual rate of 13 percent.   
With respect to inequality, past CHIP studies have reported progressive increases in 
inequality over time, and by 2007 China’s Gini coefficient approached 0.5, a level that is 
moderately high by international standards.  The 2013 CHIP data, however, show a 
substantial decline in inequality from 2007 to 2013.  For example, the Gini for CHIP 
income declined by 11 percent.  In comparison, from 2002 to 2007 the Gini coefficient 
for CHIP income increased by 5 percent.3  The decline in inequality from 2007 to 2013 
is also evident (and even larger) for the MLD and Theil indexes.   
Comparisons of NBS income, adjusted NBS income, and CHIP income reveal several 
noteworthy differences.  First, income levels and inequality for NBS income and 
adjusted NBS income are quite similar for 2007, but both income and inequality are a bit 
lower for adjusted NBS income than for NBS income in 2013.  Growth in the level of 
                                                             
3 Changes from 2002 to 2007 are from Li, Luo, and Sicular (2013, Table 2.1). 
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income is a bit smaller, and the decline in inequality is a bit larger, for adjusted NBS 
income than for NBS income.  These comparisons reveal that the change in the NBS 
definition of income results in some overstatement of the increase in the level of income, 
and some understatement in the decline in inequality, from 2007 to 2013. 
Second, CHIP income levels and inequality are different from those for both NBS 
income and adjusted NBS income.  CHIP mean incomes are higher than both NBS and 
adjusted NBS mean incomes, reflecting the inclusion of imputed rents on owner-occupied 
housing and subsidies on urban rented housing.  CHIP income inequality is higher than 
that for NBS and adjusted NBS income in 2007 and lower than that for NBS and adjusted 
NBS income in 2013.  Consequently, the decline in inequality from 2007 is largest for 
the CHIP income. 
This change in income inequality from 2007 to 2013 represents the first decline 
recorded by the CHIP since its initial survey in the late 1980s.  The decline in inequality 
as shown Table 2.3 is consistent with—in fact, somewhat larger than—that given by the 
official NBS estimates of the Gini coefficient at 0.484 in 2007 and 0.473 in 2013, a 
reduction of about 2 percent (Gustafsson, Li, and Sato 2014).  Relative to other 
countries, China’s level of inequality went from being high (among the 15 percent of 
countries with the highest Gini coefficients) to moderately high (among the 30 percent of 
countries with the highest Gini coefficients).4 
                                                             
4 Based on country Gini coefficients reported in the World Bank World Development Indicators 
database http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.9#.  Accessed December 11, 2016.    
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Geographic size and market segmentation can cause prices to differ among regions.  
Consequently, nominal incomes in different regions may not reflect real income 
differences in terms of purchasing power.  In principle, then, estimates of incomes and 
inequality should be adjusted for spatial price differences so that they reflect comparable 
purchasing power parity (PPP).   
Studies of inequality typically do not adjust incomes for spatial prices differences, 
mainly due to a lack of spatial price data.  For China, the only available estimates of 
spatial price indexes are those in Brandt and Holz (2006).  Brandt and Holz construct 
their price indexes using geographic price data from about 1990, and then they use 
provincial rural and urban price indexes published by the NBS to extend the indexes to 
2004.  We update the Brandt and Holz indexes to 2007 and 2013 using the published 
NBS cost of living price indexes for more recent years.  We then apply the updated 
indexes to the CHIP income data and calculate estimates of inequality that reflect PPP.  
The PPP estimates give an indication of how spatial price differences affect measured 
inequality, but they should be taken with a large grain of salt because Brandt and Holz’s 
indexes are anchored on very old price data. 
Table 2.4 presents estimates of inequality for NBS and CHIP income with and 
without the spatial price adjustments.  In 2007 the PPP estimates of inequality are 
substantially reduced, e.g., for CHIP income the PPP-adjusted Gini is about 11 percent 
lower, and the PPP-adjusted MLD and Theil indexes are more than 20 percent lower than 
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the unadjusted estimates.  In 2013 the differences between the PPP-adjusted and the 
unadjusted estimates are a bit smaller, reflecting the fact that from 2007 to 2013 prices 
rose more rapidly in regions with lower costs of living.   
Adjustments for PPP reduce the decline in inequality between 2007 and 2013.  As 
shown in the last column of Table 2.4, for NBS income PPP-adjusted inequality in 2013 
is nearly the same as that in 2007.  In other words, for NBS income the PPP adjustments 
essentially eliminate the decline in inequality.  For CHIP income, the decline in 
inequality survives the PPP adjustments and is 7 percent for the Gini coefficient and 11 
percent to 15 percent for the MLD and Theil measures.          
[Table 2.4 about here] 
Because the spatial price indexes are anchored on outdated prices and are so 
imprecise, hereafter we focus on estimates of inequality that are not PPP-adjusted.  
Nevertheless, we conclude from the PPP exercise that the decline in national inequality 
from 2007 to 2013 is due at least in part to changes in the relative costs of living among 
provinces and urban and rural areas. 
The CHIP data permit us to examine changes in the underlying distribution of income 
in some detail.  Figure 2.1 presents a graph of the change in household income per 
capita for each income decile, from richest to poorest.  Income levels and the percentage 
changes are in constant 2007 prices.  The vertical bars show the income levels, and the 
line shows the percentage changes.    
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[Figure 2.1 about here]   
Incomes increased in real terms for all the decile groups.  The gains were 
largest—exceeding 80 percent—for the bottom five deciles.  For higher income deciles, 
income growth was slower.  Thus, the decline in national inequality from 2007 to 2013 
was driven by income gains for the low and middle-income deciles.  This pattern differs 
from that between 2002 and 2007 when income growth went disproportionately to the top 
four deciles of the income distribution (Li, Luo, and Sicular 2013, Figure 2.2). 
The differences in income growth across deciles of the income distribution are 
evident in the changes in the Lorenz curve from 2007 to 2013 (Figure 2.2).  In the 
Lorenz curve, the population is arranged in ascending order from lowest to highest 
income per capita; the curve shows a plot of the cumulative share of income (vertical axis) 
going to the cumulative share of the population (horizontal axis).  The closer the Lorenz 
curve lies to the 45-degree line, the lower the degree of inequality.  Except for several 
percentiles at the very bottom of the income distribution, China’s national Lorenz curve 
in 2013 is everywhere closer to the 45-degree line than it is in 2007.     
[Figure 2.2 about here] 
Do these shifts in inequality reflect changes in underlying sources of income?  Table 
2.5 shows the sources of household income in 2007 and 2013.  Total income is divided 
into eight components: wage earnings, net income from household agricultural business, 
net income from non-agricultural household business, income from assets (excluding 
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imputed rents on owner-occupied housing), pension income, net transfer income 
(excluding pensions), implicit rental housing subsidies, and imputed rents on 
owner-occupied housing.  Wage earnings were the largest component of income in both 
years.  Although they grew more slowly than other components, wages contributed 45 
percent of the increase in total household income from 2007 to 2013.  The most rapidly 
growing sources of income were asset income, pensions, and imputed rents from 
owner-occupied housing.  Net income from agriculture increased in nominal terms but it 
increased more slowly than inflation, so its real change was negative. 
[Table 2.5 about here] 
To analyze the contributions of different income sources to inequality, we carry out a 
standard decomposition of the Gini coefficient by factor component, in which each 
component’s contribution to inequality depends on its share of income and how 
unequally it is distributed.  More precisely, each income component’s contribution to 
inequality is equal to its share of income times its Gini concentration coefficient 
(Shorrocks 1982).  The Gini concentration coefficient measures how unequally an 
income component is distributed relative to the distribution of total income.  For 
example, if an income component is unequally distributed such that it goes 
disproportionately to relatively low-income households in the distribution of total income, 
then that component will have a small or even negative concentration coefficient.  Such 
is the case for net income from agriculture. 
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Comparison of the concentration coefficient to the Gini coefficient for total income 
indicates whether an income component is equalizing or disequalizing.  Income 
components with concentration coefficients smaller than the Gini coefficient tend to be 
equalizing, and income components with concentration coefficients larger than the Gini 
coefficient tend to be disequalizing.  All else being equal, an income component that 
constitutes a large share of income will have a large contribution to inequality, and all 
else being equal, an income component with a high concentration coefficient will have a 
large contribution to inequality. 
Table 2.6 reports income shares, concentration coefficients, and percentage 
contributions to overall inequality for each income source.  Wage earnings are the major 
contributor to inequality in both years, although the percentage contribution to inequality 
declined from 73 percent in 2007 to 60 percent in 2013.  This large contribution to 
inequality reflects that wages remained by far the largest component of household income, 
and the concentration coefficients for wages were higher than the Gini coefficient for 
total income in both years.   
[Table 2.6 about here] 
Otherwise, components with moderately large contributions to inequality are net 
income from non-agricultural business, pensions, and imputed rents, all of which 
contributed more than 10 percent of inequality in one or both years.  All three of these 
components had concentration ratios higher than the Gini.  The contribution of 
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non-agricultural business to overall inequality remained stable at about 11 percent.  This 
was not the case for pensions and imputed rents.  The contributions to inequality of both 
pensions and imputed rents increased, and the increases were because their shares of 
income grew.  The concentration coefficients of both pensions and imputed rents fell, 
indicating that they were less disequalizing in 2013 than in 2007.      
More generally, the concentration coefficients for most major components of income 
declined from 2007 to 2013.  In some cases, the decline was substantial, e.g., wage 
earnings, pensions, and imputed rents.  The only exceptions were income from 
agriculture, which nevertheless continued to be substantially inequality-reducing, and 
rental housing subsidies, which in both years were a trivial income component (only 0.5 
percent of income).  We conclude that the decline in China’s overall Gini coefficient 
from 2007 to 2013 reflected declines in inequality of most income components, including 
wage earnings, net non-agricultural business income, pensions, asset income, and 
imputed rents.   
Income sources associated with public transfer programs merit some additional 
discussion. Pension income was distributed unequally, reflecting the relatively generous 
pensions to urban households that tended to have relatively high incomes. Nevertheless, 
the concentration coefficient of pensions declined, a reflection of the expansion and 
strengthening of pension programs for informal workers and the rural population.  
Income from other public transfer programs is part of net transfers, which income 
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category also includes private transfers.  Net transfers in both years constituted a small 
share of total income and, on balance, were equalizing.  In-depth analysis of the 
distributional impact of public social welfare and transfer programs is provided in other 
chapters. 
 
IV. Formal Urban Incomes and Inequality (Excluding Migrants) 
 
In this section, we examine changes in the level, composition, and inequality of incomes 
for formal urban residents.  Migrants are examined separately in the next section.  
Table 2.7 reports data on the level and composition of formal urban household income 
per capita in 2007 and 2013.  Average income per capita for this group increased 35 
percent from 2007 to 2013 (constant prices), equivalent to an average annual growth rate 
of 5 percent.  This pace of growth was slower than the national average (Table 2.3).  It 
was also considerably slower than the growth from 2002 to 2007, when CHIP incomes 
for formal urban residents grew at an average annual rate of 12 percent (Li, Luo, and 
Sicular 2013, p. 65).  
The breakdown by income components in Table 2.7 reveals that wage earnings 
remained the largest single source of income for formal urban households and contributed 
the largest share of income growth from 2007 to 2013.  Nevertheless, wage earnings 
grew relatively slowly and their share of total income declined from 71 percent in 2007 to 
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60 percent in 2013. 
The next largest components were pensions and imputed rents on owner-occupied 
housing.  Pension income grew at an annual rate of 8 percent and its share of income 
rose from 16 percent to 19 percent.  This growth reflects a strengthening of the urban 
pension system and the aging of the formal urban population.  Imputed rents were the 
most rapidly growing component of urban incomes, rising at an average annual rate of 12 
percent, a reflection of rising urban housing values as well as the upgrading of housing.  
By 2013 imputed rents accounted for 15 percent of urban household income, up from 10 
percent in 2007. 
Income from household businesses grew rapidly at 8 percent per year but remained a 
relatively small component, contributing 6 percent of total income in 2013.  Asset 
income also grew rapidly but remained a relatively small component at 3 percent in 2013.  
Net transfers were negative in both years, reflecting that transfers out exceeded transfers 
in.  Implicit rent subsidies were minor and contributed no more than 1 percent of 
income. 
[Table 2.7 about here] 
[Figure 2.3 about here] 
[Figure 2.4 about here] 
Figure 2.3 shows the pattern of income increases (in real terms) across deciles of the 
urban income distribution. The increase was small for the lowest decile, but for the rest of 
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the income distribution real increases in income were larger, ranging from 30 to 37 
percent in real terms. 
The consequences of this pattern of income increases are evident in the Lorenz curves 
for 2007 and 2013 (Figure 2.4).  The Lorenz curves for 2007 and 2013 are close together, 
but everywhere the 2013 curve lies slightly below the 2007 curve. This shift in the Lorenz 
curve reflects a modest increase in inequality among formal urban residents.  As shown 
in Table 2.8, the Gini coefficient for CHIP income per capita rose from 0.338 to 0.349, or 
by 3 percent.  The magnitude of the increase is slightly larger for NBS income.  The 
MLD and Theil indexes show larger increases in inequality than the Gini, reflecting their 
sensitivity to incomes at the bottom of the distribution.  
[Table 2.8 about here] 
[Table 2.9 about here] 
Decomposition of inequality by income source for formal urban residents is reported 
in Table 2.9. Wage income contributed by far the largest share of inequality, although its 
contribution declined from 76 percent in 2007 to 60 percent in 2013.  This decline was 
offset by increases in the contributions of most other sources of income.  Notably, by 
2013 the contribution to inequality of pensions had risen to 18 percent and that of 
imputed rents had risen to 15 percent.  For pensions, the increased contribution reflects 
both an increase in its inequality and its income share, although in both years it was more 
equally distributed than total income.  For imputed rents, the increased contribution 
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occurred despite a decline in its concentration coefficient; however, the concentration 
coefficient of imputed rents remained higher than the overall Gini coefficient.  The 
contribution of net transfers to inequality was negative, reflecting that net transfers on 
average were negative, i.e., transfers out on average exceeded transfers in.       
 
V. Incomes and Inequality among Rural-to-Urban Migrants 
 
In this section, we examine changes in incomes and inequality among rural-to-urban 
migrant households, with migrant classification based on the urban location of residence 
and rural household registration (hukou).  As noted above, in 2007 the migrant sample 
was obtained through an independent survey carried out by the CHIP, and in 2013 
migrants were included in the unified NBS household survey.  The migrant samples in 
the two years were thus selected using different sampling methods and may not be 
entirely consistent.  Our use of regional sampling weights in all calculations improves 
comparability, but as will be seen below some inconsistencies are still apparent.  
Migrant household income per capita remained higher than rural and lower than 
urban household incomes in both 2007 and 2013 (Table 2.10).  From 2007 to 2013, the 
income of migrant households grew 3 percent per year, more slowly than the income of 
both formal urban and rural individuals.  Consequently, the gap between migrant and 
rural incomes narrowed, whereas that between migrant and urban incomes widened.  We 
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note, however, that although migrant income per capita grew slowly, migrant income per 
worker grew at a faster pace.  The difference in growth of per capita and per worker 
income reflects a change in the structure of migrant households in the samples, 
specifically, an increase in the number of dependents.  In 2007 migrant households 
contained relatively few dependents (19 percent of migrant household members were not 
employed).  In 2013 half of the migrant household members were dependents (51 
percent of the migrant household members were not employed).  The real increase in 
wage earnings per employed person was 47.4 percent, equivalent to growth of 6.7 percent 
per year and substantially higher than the increase in wage earnings per capita. This 
change in the migrant household structure between 2007 and 2013 is a reflection of the 
evolution of migration from temporary to more permanent residence in the cities, but to 
some extent it may be due to the different sampling methods for the migrant survey in the 
two years.  
[Table 2.10 about here] 
Table 2.10 reports information on the composition of migrant income.  Most of the 
growth in migrant incomes was contributed by wages and household business income.  
These sources of income grew slowly but together they accounted for more than 90 
percent of total income.  The fastest growing component of migrant income was 
imputed rents on owner-occupied housing, which reflects the combined effect of rising 
urban housing values and the increased home ownership for this group.  The 2013 data 
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indicate that 31 percent of migrant households owned their homes, up from only 3 
percent in 2007.  Net transfers remained negative, but became less negative from 2007 
to 2013.  Negative net transfers for migrants reflect that migrants send private transfers 
out and that their contributions to social programs, such as pensions and health insurance, 
exceed their benefits.   
Figure 2.5 shows the pattern of increases in income per capita across the deciles of 
the migrant income distribution. Income growth for the lowest decile was essentially zero.  
Moving up the income distribution, income growth tended to increase from decile to 
decile, except at the very top.  The top four deciles all enjoyed income increases of more 
than 20 percent. 
[Figure 2.5 about here] 
This pattern of income growth causes the migrant Lorenz curve for 2013 to lie below 
that for 2007 everywhere except at the far-right corner, indicating that inequality 
increased for most of the migrant population (Figure 2.6).  The Gini coefficient for the 
CHIP income per capita of migrants rose by 7 percent, from 0.324 in 2007 to 0.348 in 
2013 (Table 2.11).  The Gini for NBS income shows a larger increase in inequality.  
Alternative measures of inequality reveal increases similar to or larger than the Gini 
coefficient.   
[Figure 2.6 about here] 
[Table 2.11 about here] 
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Income inequality for migrants is largely determined by the distribution of the two 
major income sources—wages and household business income (Table 2.12).  Wage 
earnings were relatively equally distributed, so their contribution to total inequality (44 
percent in 2007 and 62 percent in 2013) was lower than their share of income.  
Household business income was unequally distributed, and its contribution to inequality 
(46 percent in 2007 and 33 percent in 2013) exceeded its share of income.   
Other income components had small income shares and small contributions to 
inequality.  Between 2007 and 2013 income from assets and imputed rents became more 
equally distributed, perhaps reflecting the fact that migrants in cities had become more 
regularized and stable over time, but perhaps also due changes between 2007 and 2013 in 
the sampling method for migrants.        
[Table 2.12 about here] 
Comparing estimates of inequality that exclude and include migrants provides an 
indication of the impact of migrants on income distribution, although it does not capture 
the indirect effects of migration, e.g., on the incomes of non-migrants.  For urban China 
in 2007, the Gini coefficient for urban residents excluding migrants was not much 
different from that including migrants; in 2013 the latter was a bit higher (Table 2.13).  
Whether migrants are included or not, urban inequality increased from 2007 to 2013, with 
a somewhat larger increase for the estimates that include migrants.     
[Table 2.13 about here] 
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Table 2.14 gives estimates of the national Gini coefficient excluding and including 
migrants in the calculation.  In both years, including migrants reduces inequality.  This 
is partly due to the positive relationship between the urban-rural income gap and national 
inequality.  Including migrants, whose incomes lie between those of formal urban and 
rural residents, reduces the urban-rural income gap.  As will be discussed later, the 
urban-rural income gap has been a key factor underlying national inequality in China.  
The decline in national inequality from 2007 to 2013 is slightly larger when migrants are 
included.   
[Table 2.14 about here] 
 
VI. Rural incomes and inequality 
 
From 2007 to 2013 average rural income per capita doubled in real terms (Table 2.15), 
implying an average annual growth rate of 12.9 percent that substantially outpaced the 
7.4 percent annual growth of rural income from 2002 to 2007 (Li, Sato, and Sicular 2013, 
Table 1.3).  Indeed, growth in rural income from 2007 to 2013 approaches its high 
growth during the early years of the economic reforms in the 1980s when China carried 
out major rural reforms, including the decollectivization of agriculture, the raising of 
farm product prices, rationalization of planning of farm production, and enabling the 
growth of township and village enterprises.  
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Growth was rapid in all components of rural income except agriculture (Table 2.15).  
Wage earnings grew at an average annual rate of 12 percent and contributed 35 percent of 
the overall increase in rural incomes.  Asset income, net transfers, and imputed rents on 
owner-occupied housing grew at average annual rates exceeding 20 percent but they were 
smaller components of income and so they contributed less of the rural income increase 
than wages.  Income from non-agricultural business grew 13 percent per year.  
Information on rural pension income is not available for 2007, but pensions undoubtedly 
grew rapidly because in 2007 rural residents had limited access to pension programs.  In 
2010 the government introduced the New Rural Pension Scheme, which expanded 
rapidly thereafter.      
A notable feature of rural income trends from 2007 to 2013 was the seismic shift in 
the role of agricultural income.  Agriculture’s share of rural household income had been 
declining since the 1990s, but in 2007 it still accounted for 35 percent of rural household 
income and was roughly equivalent to wage earnings (39 percent of income).  
Agriculture’s share of income continued to decline after 2007, and by 2013 it contributed 
only 19 percent of rural household income, a far smaller share than wage earnings (36 
percent of income).  As of 2013, then, agriculture on average was a secondary income 
source for rural households.  
[Table 2.15 about here] 
Did the decline in agriculture as a source of income reflect slow growth in 
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agricultural income or the exit from farming by a segment of the rural population?  
Table 2.16 presents the proportions of rural individuals living in households that received 
non-zero income from each income source, a measure of participation in each activity.  
The share of households participating in agriculture indeed declined, but in 2013 it 
remained high at 90 percent.  For participating households, agricultural income grew 
slowly, increasing only 18 percent, or 2.8 percent per year, in real terms.  Thus, the 
decline in the importance of agricultural income reflected both slow growth in 
agricultural income and reduced participation in farming.  
Participation in wage employment and non-agricultural business also declined; in 
these areas, however, participating households experienced substantial increases in 
income.  Wage income for individuals in participating households more than doubled, 
with an average annual real growth of 13.5 percent. This rapid wage growth is consistent 
with reported shifts in the broader labor market that was characterized by shortages of 
unskilled workers and rising wages for unskilled workers (e.g., Das and N’Diaye 2013).   
The declining participation rates in each of agriculture, wage employment and 
non-agricultural business suggest that rural households were becoming increasingly 
specialized.  They also reveal the rising importance of alternative income sources.  
Specifically, the proportion of rural individuals in households receiving assets, transfers, 
and pension incomes increased markedly.  By 2013 nearly one-third of individuals lived 
in households with pension income, and virtually all rural households reported transfer 
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income, up from 73 percent in 2007.5  The share receiving asset income increased from 
34 percent to 54 percent.  These shifts reflect the expansion of China’s rural pensions 
and social programs as well as of rural asset ownership.  Indeed, by 2013 these three 
sources of income on average accounted for 19 percent of rural incomes, more than 
double their 8 percent share in 2007 (see Table 2.18 below).        
[Table 2.16 about here] 
Figure 2.7 shows real increases in household income per capita by decile in the rural 
income distribution.  All deciles of the rural population experienced substantial income 
growth, but income growth was faster for richer deciles than it was for poorer deciles.  
The lowest income decile experienced a 78 percent increase and the highest income 
decile experienced a 121 percent increase in real income.  
[Figure 2.7 about here] 
                      [Figure 2.8 about here] 
Not surprisingly, this pattern of income growth led to an downward shift of the rural 
Lorenz curve (Figure 2.8) and rural inequality as measured by the Gini and other 
inequality indexes increased (Table 2.17).  Everywhere, the rural Lorenz curve for 2013 
                                                             
5 The NBS changed the definition of transfer income for rural households in 2013.  Before 2013 
migrants who were away from their rural households for more than six months but maintained a 
strong economic connection to their rural households were treated as members of their rural 
households, and their remittances (as well as any wage earnings not sent home) were counted as 
wage income of their rural households.  In 2013 rural migrants who lived away from their rural 
households for more than six months were no longer counted as rural household members, 
regardless of their economic relationship with their rural households, and their remittances were 
classified as transfer income for their rural households. This change in the treatment of migrant 
remittances contributed to the increase in transfer income for rural households from 2007 to 2013.       
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lies below that for 2007.  The Gini coefficient for CHIP income rose by 8 percent, from 
0.374 in 2007 to 0.405 in 2013; the MLD and Theil indexes show even larger increases.  
Increases in inequality measured using NBS income were similar to those measured using 
CHIP income. 
[Table 2.17 about here] 
As shown in Table 2.18, wage income contributed the largest share of inequality, 
more than 40 percent in both 2007 and 2013.  Inequality of wage income rose between 
the two years, and in both years wages were somewhat more unequally distributed than 
total income.  Income from non-agricultural business and asset income were the most 
unequally distributed components of rural income; the former contributed 16 percent of 
inequality in both years, and the latter’s contribution rose from 5 percent in 2007 to 9 
percent in 2013. 
[Table 2.18 about here] 
The most equally distributed income components were agricultural income and net 
transfers.  Agriculture’s contribution to inequality, already low at 23 percent in 2007, 
fell to 11 percent in 2013.  This change reflected both the decline in agriculture’s share 
of total income and its increasingly equal distribution.  The contribution of net transfers 
to inequality was smaller and it also declined.  The share of income from net transfer 
income rose from 2007 to 2013, but its distribution became considerably more equal, as 
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reflected in the marked decline of its concentration coefficient.6  The contribution of 
pension income to inequality in 2013 was modest.  The concentration coefficient for 
imputed rents was a bit higher than the Gini for total income and it increased, as did its 
share of income.  Consequently, the contribution of imputed rents to inequality rose 
notably, from 9 percent in 2007 to 17 percent in 2013.         
 
VII. Urban-Rural and Regional Income Gaps 
 
Segmentation between China’s urban and rural sectors has contributed to an ongoing, 
large income gap between urban and rural households.  The urban-rural income gap 
widened continuously from the late 1980s through 2007 and it has been a key factor 
underlying the secular increase in national inequality (Li, Sato, and Sicular 2013).  From 
2007 to 2013, however, rural incomes grew more rapidly than urban incomes, with 
implications for the urban-rural income gap and national inequality.   
Table 2.19 shows mean urban and rural incomes per capita and the urban-rural 
income gap as measured by the ratio of mean urban income per capita to mean rural 
income per capita.  Estimates are given for both NBS and CHIP income, and for urban 
excluding and including migrants.  From 2007 to 2013 the increase in rural income far 
outpaced that in urban income, regardless of whether migrants are included and 
                                                             
6 See the prior footnote regarding the change in the measurement of transfers for rural 
households.  
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regardless of the income definition.  Consequently, in all cases the urban-rural income 
gap declined substantially.  For example, the ratio of mean CHIP urban to rural income 
(no PPP adjustment) was 3.5 to 4 in 2007 and below 3 in 2013.  
[Table 2.19 about here] 
In view of the difference in costs of living between the urban and rural areas, we 
report estimates of the urban-rural income gap that are adjusted for spatial price 
differences (the last two columns of Table 2.19).  The PPP adjustment reduces the gap in 
both years, especially in 2013.  The decline in the urban-rural income gap from 2007 to 
2013 is robust to the PPP adjustment.  For example, the urban-rural income ratio for 
PPP-adjusted CHIP income declined by one-third, from about 3 in 2007 to about 2 in 
2013. 
The narrowing of the urban-rural income gap from 2007 to 2013 was important to the 
decline in national inequality.  Table 2.20 reports the results of inequality 
decompositions by urban/rural population subgroups, which give estimates of the 
contribution of the urban-rural income gap to national inequality.  Without PPP 
adjustments, the urban-rural income gap’s contribution to national inequality declined 
from roughly 45-50 percent in 2007 to 25-30 percent in 2013.    
PPP adjustments reduce the size of the urban-rural gap and its contribution to 
national inequality.  Regardless, the contribution of the urban-rural gap to inequality 
declined substantially.  For PPP-adjusted CHIP income, the urban-rural gap’s 
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contribution to national inequality was roughly 40 percent in 2007 and only 15 percent in 
2013 (Table 2.20). 
[Table 2.20 about here] 
Historically China’s regional income gaps have also influenced national inequality, 
although in recent years less so than the urban-rural gap.  Table 2.21 shows the mean 
incomes for each of the Eastern, Central, and Western regions and the income ratios 
between the regions, with the Western region in the denominator.  In both years incomes 
were highest in the Eastern region and lowest in the Western region.   
From 2007 to 2013 the income gaps between the Eastern, Central, and Western 
regions narrowed.  For example, the PPP-adjusted Eastern/Central income ratio declined 
from 1.53 to 1.31, and the PPP-adjusted Eastern/Western ratio declined from 1.80 to 1.39.  
Catch-up was especially marked for the Western region, which by 2013 had average 
incomes that were only about 6 percent lower than those in the Central region.     
Compared by sector, one can see that by 2013 migrant incomes (PPP adjusted) were 
quite similar in the three regions, which likely reflects the mobility of migrant workers 
and the relocation of jobs among regions.  In 2013 formal urban incomes in the Central 
and Western regions were similar, but lower than those in the Eastern region.  Regional 
gaps were most persistent for the rural population, although they declined somewhat over 
time.   
[Table 2.21 about here] 
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[Table 2.22 about here] 
The narrowing of the regional income gaps contributed to the decline in national 
inequality.  Table 2.22 shows the results of the decomposition of inequality among 
regions.  The contribution of between-region income differences was already low in 
2007, but it declined further to less than 10 percent of national inequality in 2013.  
Furthermore, within-region inequality declined in all regions.  As shown in Table 2.23, 
within-region inequality was highest in Western China, which in 2013 had a regional Gini 
coefficient that exceeded that of China as a whole.  The Gini coefficients of the Eastern 
and Central regions were similar or lower than that for China as a whole.  
[Table 2.23 about here] 
 High inequality in Western China reflected in part the large urban-rural income gap 
(Table 2.24).  In 2007 the urban-rural income ratio without PPP adjustments in the 
Western region was 4.2, as compared to 3.3 and 3.5 in the Eastern and Central regions.  
The pattern is similar with PPP adjustments.  From 2007 to 2013 the urban-rural income 
ratio declined substantially in all regions as well as for China as a whole, but it remained 
highest in the Western region.   
[Table 2.24 about here] 
 
VIII. Robustness: Incorporating Top Incomes 
 
37 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s trends in inequality in China arose as the result of economic 
reforms, growth, and structural changes, as well as due to the evolution over time of 
differential subsidies and taxes that accompanied the dismantling of planning and the 
development of new distributional policies and programs.  Such developments 
influenced income inequality through their impacts on taxes and subsidies implicit in the 
planning system as well as on household earnings from employment, farming, and 
household businesses.  Beginning in the 1990s China began to implement economic 
reforms that opened the door to private ownership and the accumulation of household 
wealth.  Subsequently, income from assets and returns to capital emerged as new and 
increasingly key factor affecting China’s income distribution (Li, Sato, and Sicular 2013).   
In China as elsewhere, income from assets and capital tends to be held 
disproportionately by individuals in the top tail of the income distribution.  Incomes of 
individuals in the top tail of the income distribution, however, are not well represented in 
standard datasets based on household surveys, such as those of the NBS and thus the 
CHIP.  Economists have recognized this problem and have developed methods to 
estimate and incorporate incomes at the top tail in inequality measurements (e.g., 
Alvaredo et al. 2013).   
In this section, we apply one such method to obtain estimates of inequality in China 
that incorporate incomes in the top tail of the income distribution.  The approach, 
applied previously to China by Li and Luo (2011), uses publicly available information 
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about the wealth of the ultra-rich to construct the top tail of the income distribution.  The 
constructed top tail is then combined with household survey data for the rest of the 
income distribution to construct estimates of national inequality that incorporate the 
top-income group.  We begin with an overview of the methodology and then report our 
findings (see Appendix B for additional details about the methodology and our estimates).   
  
A. Methodology and Data 
Suppose the true income distribution is as shown in Figure 2.9 and that the household 
survey sample only fully captures households in Section A of the distribution with 
incomes below some threshold x0.  Ultra-rich individuals with the very highest incomes 
(in Section C) are few in number and have a low probability of being selected for the 
sample through the survey sampling process.  This group, however, tends to have high 
visibility, and information about its income or wealth is publicly available.  The next 
highest income group (B) is larger numerically.  The survey sampling process usually 
captures some individuals in this group, but they may be under-represented or their 
income may not be fully captured in the survey data.  
It is generally assumed that the distribution of income for top-income individuals 
(Sections B and C) takes the shape of a Pareto distribution (Creedy 1985; Bronfenbrenner 
1971).  The Pareto distribution is given by the equation  
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𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 − 𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝛼𝛼                             (1)  
 
with N being the number of people with income higher than x (Creedy 1985, pp. 24‒25).  
Using data for N and x taken from publicly available data for very high-income 
individuals (in Section C of the distribution), one can estimate the parameters K and α to 
obtain the shape of the income distribution for the top sections (B and C) of the income 
distribution.  This inferred income distribution for the top-income individuals can then 
be combined with the household survey data for the remainder of the income distribution 
(A) to construct an estimate of inequality for the entire population, including the 
top-income group.   
[Figure 2.9 about here] 
 These calculations require that the researcher choose an income threshold x0 for the 
top-income group.  We follow common practice and set the threshold equal to the 
highest level of income per capita observed in the survey.  The income distribution for 
individuals with income per capita above this highest observed level is then estimated 
using the Pareto distribution with information about very rich individuals available from 
public sources.  This approach implicitly assumes that the survey sample accurately 
captures the income distribution in the population up to the highest income per capita 
present in the sample.  
 We also employ an alternative threshold of 120,000 yuan per capita.  We choose 
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120,000 yuan because since 2006 by law China has required that all individuals with 
annual income exceeding 120,000 yuan file annual income tax returns and report their 
income (Gilley 2017).  This requirement creates an incentive for individuals with 
income above this level to hide or under-report their income, and, in fact, the CHIP 
samples contain very few individuals with incomes per capita higher than this threshold.7  
We estimate the income distribution for individuals with income per capita above 
120,000 yuan using the Pareto distribution and information about the top-income 
individuals from public sources.  This second set of estimates assumes that the CHIP 
survey sample accurately captures the income distribution up to but not above 120,000 
yuan per capita.8 
 For a third set of estimates, we treat 120,000 yuan as total household income rather 
than income per capita and divide by two to obtain a threshold of 60,000 yuan per capita 
for the top income group.  The number of individuals in the CHIP sample with income 
per capita above this threshold remains small.9  Once again, we estimate the income 
distribution for individuals with income per capita above 60,000 yuan using the Pareto 
distribution and information about top-income individuals from public sources.  This 
                                                             
7 Note that the income tax reporting threshold of 120,000 yuan remained unchanged over time, 
despite changes in the price level.  Only 18 and 130 individuals in the CHIP samples have 
household per capita income over 120,000 in 2007 and 2013, respectively.  The proportions 
(weighted) of the samples are 0.02 percent in 2007 and 0.29 percent in 2013. 
8 The NBS does not publish any information about how it calculates its estimates of the national 
Gini coefficient, but according to some sources within the NBS, in recent years the NBS has used 
data from the State Administration on Taxation on reported income of those with annual income 
above 120,000 yuan, which it then merges with information from with their household data.  
9 The number of individuals in the sample with income per capita over 60,000 yuan was 313 in 
2007 and 1,351 in 2013, equivalent (with weights) to 0.36 percent and 3.02 percent of the 
population in each year, respectively. 
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third set of estimates assumes that the CHIP survey sample accurately captures the 
income distribution up to but not above 60,000 yuan per capita.  
We obtain information about the wealth of the top-income individuals in China from 
two public sources, the Forbes Rich List and the Hurun Report.  Each year Forbes 
publishes a list of the 400 richest individuals and their wealth.  Hurun also publishes a 
list each year, but the number of individuals on the Hurun list has increased over time.  
In 2007 the Hurun list contained 797 individuals and in 2013 it contained 1,000 
individuals.  The larger size of the Hurun list means that it includes individuals with 
lower levels of wealth than the Forbes list.10     
We construct separate estimates based on each of these two lists, as well as estimates 
based on a combination of the two lists.  For the combined list, if an individual appears 
on both the Forbes list and the Hurun list, we include that individual in the combined list 
only once, using the average of the incomes on the two lists.  The number of individuals 
on the combined list was 873 in 2007 and 1,040 in 2013. 
The Forbes and Hurun lists report each individual’s wealth.  We convert wealth into 
an estimate of the corresponding level of annual income using the one-year fixed deposit 
interest rate.11 We do not have information about the household size of these individuals, 
                                                             
10 The lowest wealth levels of individuals on the Forbes list for 2007 is 1.5 trillion yuan and for 
2013it is 3.66 trillion yuan, as compared to 0.8 trillion and 2.0 trillion yuan, respectively, on the 
Hurun list. 
11 The one-year deposit interest rates were 3.465 percent in 2007 and 3.375 percent in 2013. An 
alternate approach would be to calculate income as the change in wealth from one year to the next, 
but this approach is problematic because of substantial wealth fluctuations from year to year and 
because individuals on the lists change from year to year. 
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but we assume that that top income households on average contain two people, which is 
the average size of the ten households with the highest levels of NBS income per capita 
as well as of the top 1 percent of households in the CHIP 2013 sample.  If top-income 
individuals in fact live in households with more people, our estimates of national 
inequality incorporating the top incomes may be overstated.  We also assume that the 
second household member does not contribute any additional income to the household, 
i.e., household per capita income in the top income group is equal to the rich individual’s 
income divided by two.  If other household members in fact contribute income to the 
household, then our estimates of national inequality incorporating the top income may be 
understated.  Note that we also calculated the estimates using alternative household sizes 
of one person and three people (see Appendix B), which changed the estimated levels of 
inequality somewhat but did not change the basic conclusion that inequality increased 
from 2007 to 2013.    
We use the NBS income definition for all calculations and estimates in this section 
because the lack of information on housing for the top-income group prevents us from 
constructing estimates of CHIP income for this group. 
 
B. The National Gini Coefficient Incorporating Top Incomes 
Table 2.25 shows our estimates of the national Gini coefficient incorporating the 
top-income group.  All estimates exceed our original Gini coefficients, but by varying 
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degrees.  For 2007 the effect of incorporating top incomes on estimated inequality is 
relatively small and quite consistent across the estimates.  The 2007 Gini estimates 
incorporating top incomes range from 0.483 to 0.502 and in all cases, they are less than 
10 percent higher than our estimate of the Gini coefficient for NBS income without the 
top incomes (Table 2.3). 
 For 2013 the impact of incorporating the top incomes is larger, and the estimates 
span a wider range.  Using the highest income in the CHIP sample as the threshold 
generally yields the lowest Gini estimates; using the 120,000 yuan and the 60,000-yuan 
cutoffs yields Gini estimates that are a bit higher and fairly similar.  For 2013 estimates 
of the Gini incorporating the top incomes range from 0.493, which is 10 percent higher 
than the Gini coefficient without the top incomes, to 0.630, a substantial 41 percent 
higher than the Gini without the top incomes.   
 Reports by the State Administration of Taxation on the number of individuals filing 
taxes provides us with some external information that we can use to evaluate the 
alternative estimates based on the 120,000 yuan and 60,000-yuan cutoffs.  As discussed 
in more detail in Appendix B, some of our calculations based on these cutoffs yield 
estimates of the top-income population that are improbably different from the reported 
numbers of tax filers, even after allowing for lack of compliance.  In our view, the 
population estimates for 2007 and 2013 based on the 60,000-yuan cutoff and the Hurun 
list are most consistent with the reported number of tax filers, and they are associated 
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with an adjusted Gini of 0.494 in 2007 and 0.583 in 2013. 
[Table 2.25 about here] 
All our estimates of the Gini incorporating the top-income group show an increase rather 
than a decline in inequality between 2007 and 2013 (Table 2.26).  For some of the 
estimates the increase is small, e.g., only 1 percent using the Forbes list and a threshold 
equal to the highest income in the CHIP sample.  For some estimates the increase is 
large, e.g., 25 percent using the combined list and the thresholds of 120,000 yuan and 
60,000 yuan.  Regardless, incorporating the top incomes gives a different picture of 
trends in inequality than that from estimates without the top incomes.    
                          [Table 2.26 about here] 
The estimates of China’s national Gini coefficient incorporating the top incomes 
depend on strong assumptions and imperfect data.  The range of estimates for 2007 is 
fairly narrow, from about .48 to .50, and in all cases less than 7 percent higher than the 
Gini without incorporating the top incomes.  For 2013 the estimates span a wider range, 
from .49 to .63 and 10 percent to 40 percent higher than the Gini without incorporating 
the top incomes.  These estimates reveal that the extent of bias in standard estimates of 
inequality in China arising from the under-representation of incomes in the top tail of the 
income distribution was probably modest in 2007 but had become substantial in 2013.      
     
IX. Conclusion 
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Estimates of inequality published by the NBS indicate that since 2007 income inequality 
in China has turned a corner.  Our core estimates based on the CHIP survey data for 
2007 and 2013 also show a decline in inequality, and the decline is robust to alternative 
income definitions (NBS and CHIP) and different inequality indexes (Gini, MLD, and 
Theil).  These alternative calculations yield somewhat different levels of inequality, but 
for all income definitions and indexes inequality has declined.   
Disaggregating among subgroups and sources of income, we find that the decline 
reflects reductions in several important dimensions of inequality.  The rural-urban 
income gap narrowed.  Regional income gaps between the Eastern, Central, and Western 
regions shrank.  Inequality declined for the major components of household 
income—wage earnings, income from agriculture and non-agricultural household 
business, asset income, pensions, and imputed rents on owner-occupied housing.  
Reduced inequality in these dimensions contributed to the decline in overall income 
inequality nationwide.  The decline in national inequality would have been even larger if 
it had not been offset to some degree by rising inequality within the urban and rural 
sectors and by the growing importance of unequally distributed income components, such 
as income from assets and imputed rents on owner-occupied housing. 
In recent years China has experienced a slowdown in macroeconomic growth.  
According to NBS statistics, average growth in GDP per capita from 2007 to 2013 was 
46 
 
8.5 percent, as compared to 11 percent from 2002 to 2007.  Some observers have 
suggested that the slowdown in GDP growth will have negative implications for 
household incomes in general and for the middle- and lower-income groups in particular.  
Our exploration of the CHIP data indeed finds that on average growth in household 
incomes slowed from 2007 to 2013, but the slowdown was mainly for higher income 
groups, including urban residents both formal and migrant.  For lower- and 
middle-income households, including rural residents, income growth accelerated and 
averaged more than 10 percent per year.  Income growth for lower- and middle-income 
groups occurred despite slow growth in agricultural income and it reflected solid growth 
in their wage income plus robust growth in their combined income from non-agricultural 
business, assets, and pensions, as well as imputed rent on owner-occupied housing.     
Although the decline in national inequality holds for different income definitions and 
alternative inequality measures, it is not entirely robust.  When we adjust the estimates 
to correct for spatial differences in the cost of living, inequality no longer declines for 
NBS income and for CHIP income the decline is noticeably reduced.  These results 
indicate that some of the apparent reduction in inequality from 2007 to 2013 is due to 
price changes rather than changes in real incomes. 
When we adjust the estimates to correct for under-representation of top-income 
groups in the survey sample, the decline in inequality disappears entirely.  Indeed, 
certain scenarios of this exercise yield a substantial increase in inequality from 2007 to 
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2013.  Our estimates incorporating top incomes suggest that an understatement of 
inequality due to the under-representation of top incomes was modest in 2007 but 
substantial in 2013.  Although these adjusted estimates are sensitive to our assumptions 
and data for the top-income group, they nevertheless indicate that some, if not all, of the 
apparent reduction in inequality from 2007 to 2013 is due to the growing importance of 
top-income individuals and their incomes, which are not captured in the household 
surveys.  Future analyses of inequality in China must devote attention to this problem.  
  Our findings of changing inequality and shifting income patterns raise a series of 
important questions about the underlying causes.  To what extent were incomes and 
inequality affected by the Global Financial Crisis?  How exactly did the new social 
programs implemented during the Hu-Wen period—for example, the expansion of 
medical insurance, pensions, and minimum livelihood guarantee (dibao) 
programs—contribute to the decline in inequality?  What was the role of ongoing 
urban-rural migration and the government’s push to accelerate urbanization? Did 
changing human capital and rising education levels underlie the growth in wage earnings 
and thus income distribution?  Some of these questions are addressed in other chapters 
of this volume, whereas others await further research. 
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Appendix A.  Adjustments to the Definition of Household Income and the 
Relationship between NBS Income, adjusted NBS Income, and CHIP Income 
 
 
Between 2007 and 2013 the NBS changed its definition of income and changed what 
was included in the different components of income.  Consequently, NBS income and 
its components in 2007 are not consistent with NBS income and its components in 2013.  
In this Appendix, we summarize the major changes that NBS made to its definition of 
income and to income components.  We then describe the adjustments made to the 
original NBS income variable to construct an alternate measure of NBS income that is 
consistent between 2007 and 2013, called “adjusted NBS income.”  
 In most respects, adjusted NBS income follows the 2013 NBS income definition; in 
other words, to the extent possible 2007 NBS income is adjusted so as to match the new 
2013 NBS income definition.  For several items, the relevant information needed to 
make the adjustment to the 2007 income is not available, and the 2013 NBS income is 
adjusted to be consistent in these areas with the 2007 NBS income.  Some additional 
adjustments are also made to address the errors and inconsistencies in the NBS income 
definition.   
 All adjustments are carried out using the relevant household-level data in the CHIP 
2007 and 2013 datasets.  Note that “CHIP income” is equal to the adjusted NBS income 
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plus rental subsidies and imputed rents on owner-occupied housing (see the text for a 
further explanation). 
 
Summary of the Major Changes in the NBS Income Definition between 2007 and 
2013 and the Steps Taken to Construct the Adjusted NBS Income 
 
1) For urban households, severance payments in 2013 were classified as wage 
earnings but they were classified as transfer income in 2007; in the 2007 
adjusted NBS income for urban households, severance payments have been 
removed from the transfer income and added to wage earnings. 
2) For urban households, wage earnings in 2013 but not in 2007 include in-kind 
payments from employers and employer contributions to social insurance 
schemes; for the adjusted NBS income of urban households in 2007 these 
items have been added to urban wage earnings. 
3) Rental income earned from real-estate properties is treated as asset income in 
2013 but it is treated as business income in 2007; in the 2007 adjusted NBS 
income this item has been moved from business income to asset income. 
4) Income from intellectual property is treated as business income in 2013 but it 
is as asset income in 2007; in the 2007 adjusted NBS income this item has 
been moved from asset income to business income. 
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5) 2007 NBS asset income includes “income from investment” and “income 
from other assets,” but these two items are not included in the 2013 NBS 
income; in the 2013, adjusted NBS income these two items have been 
removed from asset income. 
6) The 2013 urban NBS income includes an estimate of imputed rents on 
owner-occupied housing as part of asset income, but the method the NBS 
used to estimate the imputed rents is incorrect; in the 2013 adjusted NBS 
income this item has been removed from urban incomes.  Consequently, 
neither the 2007 nor the 2013 adjusted NBS income includes imputed rents 
on owner-occupied housing (in 2007 NBS income did not include imputed 
rents on owner-occupied housing). 
7) In the 2013 NBS income the interest paid on consumption loans is subtracted 
from the asset income; this treatment of consumption-loan interest is 
inconsistent with the 2007 NBS income and with international practices.  In 
the 2013 adjusted NBS income, interest on consumption loans has been 
added back to asset income. 
8) The 2007 and 2013 NBS incomes include pension income as a component of 
net transfer income; in the adjusted NBS income for both years, pension 
income is removed from net transfer income and treated as a separate income 
component. 
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9) The 2007 NBS income includes reimbursements for medical expenses as part 
of net transfer income.  This item is not included in the 2013 NBS income.  
Information on this item is available for 2013 but not for 2007.  For 
consistency across the two years, reimbursements for medical expenses are 
added to the 2013 adjusted NBS income as part of the net transfers.  
10) The 2007 NBS income for rural (but not urban) households includes gifts 
received for weddings and funerals and one-time compensations as part of net 
transfer income.  These items are not included in the 2013 NBS income.  
Information on these items is available for 2013 but not for 2007.  For 
consistency across the two years, these items are added to the 2013 rural 
adjusted NBS income as part of the net transfers.          
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Appendix B.  Methodology for Incorporating Top Incomes in the Estimation of the 
Gini Coefficient 
 
The income distribution for the top-income individuals is assumed to follow the 
Pareto distribution 
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 − 𝛼𝛼𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝛼𝛼                            (B. 1)  
 
where N is the number of people with income higher than x (Creedy 1985, pp. 24–25).  
The values of N and x are taken from the available data for the top-income individuals; 
the parameters K and α are estimated.   
 For the Pareto distribution, the Gini coefficient among the top-income individuals 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 is given by the formula (Lambert 1989, p. 29):   
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 12α−1                                 (B. 2)  
 
Equation (B.2) reveals that the estimate of the Gini for the top-income group depends 
entirely on the magnitude of parameter α.  The larger the value of α, the smaller the 
value of Ginitop.   
 Also, for the Pareto distribution the mean income of the top-income group is a 
function of the income threshold for the top-income group.  For any given threshold x0, 
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the mean income of the top-income group µtop is  
 
𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥0𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼−1                                          (B. 3)  
 
To obtain estimates of the parameters K and α of the Pareto distribution, we apply an 
OLS regression to Equation (B.1).  We then input these estimated parameters into 
Equations (B.2) and (B.3) to calculate the estimates of the Gini coefficient and the mean 
income of the top-income group.  We also use the estimated parameters to predict the 
population of individuals in the top-income group 𝑙𝑙� for any given x0 using the formula 
 
𝑙𝑙� = exp (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙� −𝛼𝛼�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝛼𝛼0)                         (B. 4)  
 
According to Sundrum (1990), the Gini coefficient for the entire income distribution 
Giniwhole can be calculated based on the Gini coefficients, population shares, and mean 
incomes of two subgroups as follows: 
 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 𝑃𝑃12 𝜇𝜇1𝜇𝜇 𝐺𝐺1 + 𝑃𝑃22 𝜇𝜇2𝜇𝜇 𝐺𝐺2 + 𝑃𝑃1𝑃𝑃2 �𝜇𝜇2−𝜇𝜇1𝜇𝜇 �                       (B. 5)  
 
In our application, P1 is the population share of the population represented by the 
household survey, P2 is the population share of the top-income group, µ1 and µ2 are the 
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mean incomes of these two groups, and µ is the population-weighted mean income of the 
entire population including both groups.  G1 is the Gini of the population represented by 
the household survey, and G2 is the Gini for the top-income group.  P1, µ1, and G1 are 
estimated using information from the household survey; P2, µ2, and G2 are estimated 
using Equations (B.1) through (B.4) with publicly available information about the 
top-income individuals on the Forbes, Hurun, and the combined lists (as discussed in the 
text).    
Table B2.1 reports the regression estimates for Equation (B.1) based on each of the 
Forbes, Hurun, and combined lists.  The estimates of α are similar for the three lists, 
falling between 1.29 and 1.34 in 2007 and between 1.59 and 1.73 in 2013.     
[Table B2.1 about here] 
 Using the parameter estimates in Table B2.1, we calculate estimates of the number of 
individuals (N), population share (P2), average income (µtop), and Gini coefficient (Ginitop) 
of the top-income group for each of the Forbes, Hurun, and the combined lists in 2007 
and 2013.  Estimates in the top panel of Table B2.2 use a threshold for the top-income 
group x0 of 120,000 yuan per capita; the middle panel uses a threshold of 60,000 yuan per 
capita; the bottom panel uses a threshold equal to the highest income per capita reported 
in the CHIP survey samples.  The highest incomes in the survey are in fact substantially 
higher than 120,000 yuan, so using this threshold generates higher average incomes and a 
smaller population for the top-income group.  The choice of the cutoff does not, 
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however, affect inequality within the top-income group, because Ginitop is based on the 
parameter α, which is estimated using information in the Forbes, Hurun, and the 
combined lists.   
[Table B2.2 about here] 
 In all cases, the population of the top-income group is smallest for the estimates 
based on the Forbes list, larger for estimates based on the Hurun list, and largest for the 
combined list.  Also, the population is largest for the lowest cutoff (60,000 yuan) and 
smallest for the highest cutoff (the highest income in the CHIP sample).   
 We can evaluate the estimates for the cutoffs based on the income tax filing 
requirement in relation to the information published by the Office of the State 
Administration of Taxation, which reported that in 2007 the number of individuals in 
China with incomes over 120,000 yuan who filed income tax returns exceeded 2 
million.12  Assuming a household of two members for each of these income tax filers, 
we would expect that the population of individuals with income per capita above 120,000 
yuan in 2007 should, at the very minimum be about 4 million (but probably more, due to 
noncompliance with the tax filing requirements).  Consequently, we regard the estimates 
that use the 120,000-yuan cutoff to yield the top-income populations to be improbably 
low (all less than 2 million).  The estimates based on the 60,000-yuan cutoff and the 
                                                             
12 The Office of the State Administration of Taxation reported that in 2007 the number of tax 
returns filed by individuals with incomes above 120,000 yuan was 2,126,786 
(http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810219/n810724/c1218703/content.html). Many sources (e.g., 
Gilley 2017; http://www.kanshangjie.com/article/52811-1.html) note that the number of income 
tax filers is unreasonably small, reflecting weak compliance with the personal income tax filing 
requirements.    
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Hurun list and the combined lists give top-income populations for 2007 that in all cases 
are greater than 2 million yuan and thus they are more believable.       
 For 2015 the State Administration of Taxation reported that 28 million individuals 
with incomes over 120,000 yuan filed taxes.13  Assuming there are two people per 
household implies the population of this group is 56 million, equivalent to about 4 
percent of the 2015 national population (again, likely understated due to noncompliance).  
For 2013 the number of tax filers and their population share would have been a bit lower 
than this.  Based on these numbers, for 2013 we regard the estimated population for the 
120,000-yuan cutoff and the Forbes and Hurun lists to be low (both less than 40 million), 
and for the 60,000-yuan cutoff and the combined list to be high (over 200 million).   
Table B2.3 reports information for the rest of the income distribution based on the 
CHIP 2007 and 2013 survey data.  This information is combined with the estimates for 
the top-income group in the previous table to estimate Giniwhole using Equation (B.5). 
The top panel of Table B2.3 shows the mean incomes, highest incomes, and Gini 
coefficients for the full samples.  In both years the highest incomes exceeded 120,000 
yuan, although less than 1 percent of the sample had incomes above this threshold; a 
larger but still small proportion of the sample had incomes above the 60,000-yuan 
threshold (see the note to Table B2.3).   
                                                             
13 Statistics on the number of personal income tax filers are not available for all years.  They are 
not available for 2013, but for 2015 it was 28 million (Gilley 2017; 
http://www.kanshangjie.com/article/52811-1.html). Available reports indicate that the number has 
grown year over year, so in 2013 it was very likely less than 28 million.  
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The bottom panels of Table B2.3 report the mean income, highest income, and Gini 
coefficient after dropping individuals with income per capita above 120,000 yuan or 
above 60,000 yuan from the CHIP samples.  Removing individuals with incomes above 
120,000 yuan has only a small impact on the mean income and the Gini coefficient.  In 
2013, for example, the mean income is only 2.5 percent lower and the Gini is only 2.6 
percent lower than that for the full sample.  Removing individuals with incomes above 
60,000 yuan makes a greater difference; for example, in 2013 the mean income is 11.0 
percent lower and the Gini is 9.2 percent lower than that for the full sample.       
[Table B2.3 about here] 
We also calculated estimates using alternative household sizes of one person and 
three people for the top-income group.  The resulting Gini coefficients are reported in 
Table B2.4.  These alternative household size assumptions alter the level of the national 
Gini, with a smaller household size yielding a higher level of inequality and a larger 
household size yielding a lower level of inequality.  Regardless, in all cases inequality 
increases from 2007 to 2013. 
 
[Table B2.4 about here] 
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Table 2.1. Features of the CHIP 2007 and 2013 household survey samples 
 2007 2013 
 Urban Rural Migrant Urban Rural Migrant 
Number of individuals 29,262 51,847 8,404 20,331 39,408 2,839 
Number of households 10.000 13,000 4,978 6,866 10,550 1.011 
Number of provinces 15 15 9 15 15 15 
Notes: 
1.) The 2007 urban and rural samples each cover six Eastern provinces (Beijing, Hebei (rural 
only), Liaoning, Shanghai (urban only), Jiangsu, Fujian, and Guangdong), five Central provinces 
(Shanxi, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan), and four Western provinces (Chongqing, Sichuan, 
Yunnan, and Gansu).  The 2007 migrant sample covers the five largest migrant outflow 
provinces (Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Chongqing, and Sichuan) and the four largest migrant inflow 
provinces (Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong). 
2.) The 2013 urban rural and migrant samples cover the same provinces: five Eastern provinces 
(Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shandong, and Guangdong), five Central provinces (Shanxi, Anhui, 
Henan, Hubei, and Hunan), and five Western provinces (Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, 
and Xinjiang).   
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Table 2.2. Regional and urban/rural compositions of the CHIP 2007 and 2013 Samples, with 
and without sampling weights (%) 
 Without Weights With Weights 
 2007 2013 2007 2013 
urban 32.69 32.49 34.51 40.93 
rural 57.92 62.97 54.21 45.77 
migrant 9.39 4.54 11.28 13.30 
Eastern 44.86 33.89 39.85 41.48 
Central 32.75 35.93 32.21 31.49 
Western 22.39 30.18 27.94 27.03 
Notes: The sampling weights are two-level (Eastern/Central/Western x urban/rural/migrant) 
weights (“weights 2”) (Yue and Sicular 2013).  See Yue and Sicular (2013) for a detailed 
discussion of the construction of the sampling weights.  The composition of the CHIP samples 
with weights is equal to the shares of each sector/region in the national population (based on 
China’s census and annual population surveys as reported by the NBS). 
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Table 2.3. National average household income per capita and income inequality, 2007 and 
2013 
 2007 2013 change (%) 
(a) NBS income per capita 
income (yuan) 9353 19023 +68.7 
Gini 0.470 0.448 -4.68 
MLD 0.401 0.356 -11.22 
Theil 0.380 0.350 -7.89 
(b) adjusted NBS income per capita 
income (yuan) 9432 18208 +60.2 
Gini 0.478 0.436 -8.79 
MLD 0.401 0.331 -17.46 
Theil 0.388 0.333 -14.18 
(c) CHIP income per capita 
income (yuan) 10934 21190 +60.8 
Gini 0.486 0.433 -10.91 
MLD 0.428 0.328 -23.36 
Theil 0.405 0.325 -19.75 
Notes: Here and elsewhere, calculated using the CHIP data and weights (see the text).   
Income levels are in current prices; income changes are in constant prices and  
deflated using the NBS national consumer price index which shows a price  
level increase of 20.536 percent from 2007 to 2013.  The MLD and Theil indexes 
belong to the general entropy (GE) family of indexes; the MLD is also known as the 
Theil L or GE(0) index, and the Theil T is known as the GE(1) index.     
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Table 2.4. National income inequality with and without Spatial PPP adjustments, 2007 
and 2013 
 2007 2013 change from 2007 to 2013 (%) 
 without PPP 
with 
PPP 
difference 
(%) 
without 
PPP 
with 
PPP 
difference 
(%) 
without 
PPP 
with 
PPP 
(a) NBS income per capita 
Gini 0.470 0.417 -11.3 0.448 0.414 -7.8 -4.7 -1.0 
MLD 0.401 0.309 -22.9 0.356 0.300 -15.7 -11.2 -2.9 
Theil 0.380 0.298 -21.6 0.350 0.299 -14.6 -7.9 +0.3 
(b) CHIP income per capita 
Gini 0.486 0.431 -11.3 0.433 0.400 -7.6 -10.9 -7.2 
MLD 0.428 0.328 -23.4 0.328 0.278 -15.2 -23.4 -15.2 
Theil 0.405 0.315 -22.2 0.325 0.280 -13.8 -19.8 -11.1 
Note: PPP estimates use urban/rural x province spatial price indexes from Brandt and Holz (2006), 
updated to 2007 and 2013 using urban/rural x province cost of living indexes published by the 
NBS. 
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Table 2.5. National average household income per capita growth and composition, 
2007 and 2013 
 
Mean income 
(yuan) Change from 2007 to 2013 
Income component 2007 2013 Nominal 
increase 
（yuan） 
Contribution 
to increase in 
total income 
(%) 
Nominal 
increase 
(%) 
Real 
increase 
(%) 
Real 
average 
annual 
growth  
(%) 
Wage earnings 6981 11576 4595 44.9 65.8 37.6 5.5 
Net income from non-agricultural 
business 
1166 2154 987 9.6 84.7 53.2 7.4 
Net income from agriculture 891 1022 131 1.3 14.7 -4.8 -0.8 
Asset income 224 722 498 4.9 222.8 167.8 17.8 
Net transfers -355 55 410 4.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Pensions 1066 2669 1603 15.6 150.4 107.7 13.0 
Implicit subsidies on rental 
housing 
51 101 50 0.5 99.4 65.5 8.8 
Imputed rents on owner-occupied 
housing 
912 2881 1969 19.2 216.0 162.2 17.4 
Total income 10935 21180 10244 100.0 93.7 60.7 8.2 
Notes:  CHIP income per capita.  Income levels are in current prices; real increases are 
converted to 2007 constant prices using the national consumer price index published by the NBS 
(1.20526). Here and elsewhere imputed rents on owner-occupied housing and pensions are shown 
as separate income categories (the former are not included in asset income and the latter are not 
included in net transfer income.  The 2007 CHIP data report the income component “other 
in-kind income” for urban residents, a small item (on average 1 yuan per capita) reflecting mostly 
in-kind payments by employers.  The CHIP 2013 data do not give separate information on 
“other in-kind income.”  Therefore, in this and later tables we include this component of 2007 
urban income as part of the urban wage income.  Net income from agriculture is not reported 
separately for formal urban residents and migrants.  These groups are unlikely to have 
agricultural income, so we simply categorize the net business income of urban residents and 
migrants as “net income from non-agricultural household business.” 
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Table 2.6. Decomposition of national inequality by income source, 2007 and 2013 
 2007 2013 
Income source 
Share 
(%) 
Concentration 
coefficient 
Contribution 
to inequality 
(%) 
Share 
(%) 
Concentration 
coefficient 
Contribution 
to inequality 
(%) 
Wage earnings 63.8 0.554  72.8 54.6 0.477 60.2 
Net income from 
non-agricultural business 
10.7 0.506  11.1 10.2 0.471  11.1 
Net income from agriculture 8.1 -0.211  -3.5 4.8 -0.169  -1.9 
Asset income 2.0 0.592  2.5 3.4 0.572  4.5 
Net transfer income -3.2 0.801  -5.4 0.3 -7.439  -5.3 
Pension income 9.7 0.649  13.0 12.6 0.568  16.5 
Rental housing subsidies 0.5 0.705  0.7 0.5 0.730  0.8 
Imputed rents on 
owner-occupied housing 
8.3 0.516  8.8 13.6 0.448  14.1 
Total income 100.0 0.486 100.0 100.0 0.433 100.0 
Notes: CHIP income per capita; the decomposition is done using the standard decomposition of 
the Gini coefficient (Shorrocks 1982).  The (Gini) concentration coefficient is also known as the 
pseudo Gini.  The concentration ratio of the total income is the Gini coefficient of the total 
income.   
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Table 2.7. Formal urban household income per capita growth and composition, 2007 and 2013 
 
Mean income (yuan) Change from 2007 to 2013 
Income component 2007 2013 Nominal 
increase 
（yuan） 
Contribution 
to increase in 
total income 
(%) 
Nominal 
increase 
(%) 
Real 
increase 
(%) 
Real 
average 
annual 
growth  
(%) 
Wage earnings 13584 18443  4859  41.3  35.8  13.3  2.1  
Net income from business 1043 1953  910  7.7  87.2  56.3  7.7  
Asset income 373 852  479  4.1  128.7  90.8  11.4  
Net transfers -895  -938  -42  -0.4  4.7  -12.6  -2.2  
Pensions 3089 5932  2843  24.2  92.1  60.3  8.2  
Implicit subsidies on rental 
housing 147 247  100  0.9 68.1  40.3  5.8  
Imputed rents on 
owner-occupied housing 1872 4494  2622  22.3  140.1  100.4  12.3  
Total income 19212 30983  11772  100.0  61.3  34.6  5.1  
Notes:  CHIP income per capita, excluding migrants. Income levels are in current prices; real 
increases are converted to 2007 constant prices using the urban consumer price index published 
by the NBS (1.19829).  
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Table 2.8. Estimates of income inequality among formal urban households, 2007 and 
2013 
 2007 2013 change (%) 
(a) NBS income per capita 
Gini 0.334 0.355 6.3 
MLD 0.189 0.212 12.2 
Theil 0.192 0.223 16.4 
(b) CHIP income per capita 
Gini 0.338 0.349 3.3 
MLD 0.191 0.205 7.3 
Theil 0.191 0.214 12.0 
Note:  Excluding migrants. 
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Table 2.9. Decomposition of the formal urban Gini coefficient by income source 
 2007 2013 
Income component 
Income 
share 
(%) 
Concentration 
coefficient 
Contribution 
to inequality 
(%) 
Income 
share 
(%) 
Concentration 
coefficient 
Contribution 
to inequality 
(%) 
Wage earnings 70.7 0.364 76.2 59.5 0.352 60.0 
Net income from business 5.4 0.227 3.6 6.3 0.330 6.0 
Asset income 1.9 0.509 2.9 2.7 0.575 4.5 
Net transfers -4.7 0.499 -6.9 -3.0 0.550 -4.8 
Pensions 16.1 0.248 11.8 19.1 0.326 17.9 
Implicit subsidies on rental 
housing 0.8 0.348 0.8 0.8 0.530 1.2 
Imputed rents on 
owner-occupied housing 9.7 0.399 11.5 14.5 0.364 15.1 
Total income 100 0.338 100 100 0.349 100 
Notes: CHIP income per capita, excluding migrants. Decomposition method is the standard 
decomposition of the Gini coefficient (Shorrocks 1982). The (Gini) concentration coefficient is 
also known as the pseudo Gini. 
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Table 2.10. Migrant household income per capita growth and composition, 2007 and 
2013 
 
Mean income 
(yuan) Change from 2007 to 2013 
Income component 2007 2013 
Nominal 
increase 
（yuan） 
Contribution to 
increase in 
total income 
(%) 
Nominal 
increase 
(%) 
Real 
increase 
(%) 
Real average 
annual growth 
(%) 
Wage earnings 11480 15110 3630 51.7 31.6 9.8 1.6 
Net income from business 4786 5938 1152 16.4 24.1 3.5 0.6 
Asset income 166 362 196 2.8 117.7 81.7 10.5 
Net transfers -1447 -820 627 8.9 -43.3 -52.7 -11.7 
Pensions n.a. 341 341 4.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Imputed rents on 
owner-occupied housing 
352 1328 976 13.9 277.4 214.9 21.1 
Total income 15233 22259 7026 100.0 46.1 21.9 3.4 
Notes:  CHIP income per capita.  Income levels are in current prices; real increases are 
converted to 2007 constant prices using the urban consumer price index published by the NBS 
(1.19829).  Information on pensions was not available for migrants in 2007, so we do not 
calculate the growth rates for this income source; migrant pensions were likely to have been very 
small or zero in 2007. 
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Table 2.11. Estimates of income inequality among migrant households, 2007 and 2013 
 2007 2013 change (%) 
(a) NBS income per capita 
Gini 0.300 0.349 16.3 
MLD 0.153 0.184 20.3 
Theil 0.173 0.217 25.4 
(b) CHIP income per capita 
Gini 0.324 0.348 7.4 
MLD 0.168 0.183 8.9 
Theil 0.203 0.216 6.4 
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Table 2.12. Decomposition of the migrant Gini coefficient by income source 
 2007 2013 
Income component 
Income 
share 
(%) 
Concentration 
coefficient 
Contribution 
to inequality 
(%) 
Income 
share 
(%) 
Concentration 
coefficient 
Contribution 
to inequality 
(%) 
Wage earnings 69.7 0.198 43.9 67.9 0.318 62.0 
Net income from business 35.2 0.409 45.8 26.7 0.427 32.7 
Asset income 0.7 0.780 1.6 1.6 0.458 2.1 
Net transfers -7.8 -0.149 3.7 -3.7 0.479 -5.1 
Pensions n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.5 0.456 2.1 
Imputed rents on 
owner-occupied housing 
2.2 0.700 5.0 6.0 0.366 6.3 
Total income 100 0.315 100 100 0.348 100 
Notes: CHIP income per capita. Decomposition method is the standard decomposition of the Gini 
coefficient (Shorrocks 1982). The (Gini) concentration coefficient is also known as the pseudo 
Gini. 
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Table 2.13. Estimates of the urban Gini coefficient excluding and including migrants, 
2007 and 2013 
 2007 2013 change (%) 
(a) NBS income per capita 
Gini excluding 
migrants 0.334 0.355 6.3 
Gini including migrants 0.327 0.359 9.8 
(b) CHIP income per capita 
Gini excluding 
migrants 0.338 0.349 3.3 
Gini including migrants 0.339 0.356 5.0 
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Table 2.14. Estimates of the national Gini coefficient excluding and including migrants, 
2007 and 2013 
 2007 2013 change (%) 
(a) NBS income per capita 
Gini excluding 
migrants 0.476 0.462 -2.94 
Gini including migrants 0.469 0.448 -4.48 
(b) CHIP income per capita 
Gini excluding 
migrants 0.502 0.445 -11.35 
Gini including migrants 0.486 0.433 -10.91 
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Table 2.15. Rural household income per capita growth and composition, 2007 to 2013 
 
Mean income 
(yuan) Change from 2007 to 2013 
Income component 
2007 2013 
Nominal 
increase 
（yuan） 
Contribution 
to increase in 
total income 
(%) 
Nominal 
increase 
(%) 
Real 
increase 
(%) 
Real average 
annual 
growth 
(%) 
Wage earnings 1839  4407  2568  35.0  139.6  95.40  11.8  
Net income from agriculture 1644  2234  590  8.1  35.9  10.82  1.7  
Net income from 
non-agricultural business 492  1235  743  10.1  151.0  104.70  12.7  
Asset income 141  710  569  7.8  404.4  311.32  26.6  
Net transfers 216  1198  982  13.4  454.8  352.39  28.6  
Pensions 0  426  426  5.8  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Imputed rents on 
owner-occupied housing 439  1889  1450  19.8  330.7  251.17  23.3  
Total income 4770  12098  7328  100.0  153.6  106.82  12.9  
Notes:  CHIP income per capita.  Income levels are in current prices; real increases are 
converted to 2007 constant prices using the rural consumer price index published by the NBS 
(1.22633).  Information on pensions was not available for rural households in 2007, but rural 
pensions were likely to have been minimal.   
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Table 2.16. Shares of individuals in rural households with non-zero income by 
income component, 2007 and 2013 
 
% of individuals in 
households 
 with non-zero 
income from this 
source 
mean income per capita from this 
source among households with 
non-zero income (yuan) 
Income component 2007 2013 2007 2013 real change (%) 
Wage earnings 89.4 80.8 2,063 5,447 115.3 
Net income from agriculture 95.3 90.4 1,709 2,478 18.2 
Net income from 
non-agricultural business 39.2 27.6 1,251 4,482 192.2 
Asset income 33.8 54.4 428 1,296 146.9 
Net transfers 73.4 98.3 289 1219 244.0 
Pensions n.a. 30.5 n.a. 1,385 n.a. 
Imputed rents on 
owner-occupied housing 100 98.9 439 1,911 255.0 
Notes: CHIP income per capita. Income levels are in current prices; the real increase is in constant 
prices and deflated using the rural consumer price index published by the NBS (1.22633). 
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Table 2.17. Estimates of rural income inequality, 2007 and 2013 
 2007 2013 change (%) 
(a) NBS income per capita 
Gini 0.376 0.407 8.2 
MLD 0.234 0.273 16.7 
Theil 0.253 0.292 15.4 
(b) CHIP income per capita 
Gini 0.374  0.405  8.3 
MLD 0.232  0.273  17.7 
Theil 0.251  0.297  18.3 
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Table 2.18. Decomposition of the rural Gini coefficient by income source 
 2007 2013 
Income component 
Income 
share 
(%) 
Concentration 
coefficient 
Contribution 
to inequality 
(%) 
Income 
share 
(%) 
Concentration 
coefficient 
Contribution 
to inequality 
(%) 
Wage earnings 38.6 0.401 41.4 36.4 0.458 41.2 
Net income from agriculture 34.5 0.253 23.3 18.5 0.229 10.5 
Net income from non-agricultural 
business 10.3 0.591 16.3 10.2 0.623 15.7 
Asset income 3.0 0.637 5.0 5.9 0.648 9.4 
Net transfers 4.5 0.385 4.7 9.9 0.097 2.4 
Pensions n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.5 0.489 4.3 
Imputed rents on owner-occupied 
housing 9.2 0.380 9.3 15.6 0.429 16.6 
Total income 100 0.373 100 100 0.405 100 
Notes: CHIP income per capita. Decomposition method is the standard decomposition of the Gini 
coefficient (Shorrocks 1982). The (Gini) concentration coefficient is also known as the pseudo 
Gini. 
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Table 2.19. The urban-rural income gap, 2007 and 2013 
 Mean income per 
capita (yuan) 
Change, 
2007 to 
2013  
(%) 
Ratio  
(no PPP 
adjustment) 
Ratio 
(with PPP 
adjustment) 
 2007 2013 2007 2013 2007 2013 
(a) NBS income per capita 
Urban, excl. migrants 14982 28559 59.1 3.46 2.90 2.52 2.20 
Urban, incl. migrants 15298 26764 46.0 3.53 2.72 2.57 2.06 
Rural 4331 9850 85.5 -- -- -- -- 
(b) CHIP income per capita 
Urban, excl. migrants 19212 30983 34.6 4.03 2.56 2.94 1.90 
Urban, incl. migrants 18231 28843 32.0 3.82 2.38 2.77 1.76 
Rural 4770 12098 106.8 -- -- -- -- 
Notes:  Income levels are in current prices; percentage changes are in constant prices.  PPP 
estimates use the urban/rural x province spatial price indexes from Brandt and Holz (2006), 
updated to 2007 and 2013 using urban/rural x province cost of living indexes published by the 
NBS.   
  
80 
 
Table 2.20. Contribution of the urban-rural income gap to national inequality (%) 
 No PPP adjustment With PPP adjustment 
 NBS income CHIP income NBS income CHIP income 
 2007 2013 2007 2013 2007 2013 2007 2013 
MLD 47.24 31.71 49.94 26.79 34.63 19.97 38.35 15.11 
Theil 46.22 30.72 48.22 25.89 34.98 20.05 38.47 15.02 
Notes:  Urban includes migrants.  For inequality indexes belonging to the general entropy class 
of indexes GE(α), as is the case for the MLD and Theil indexes (α = 0 for MLD and = 1 for 
the Theil), inequality between subgroups is as follows: GE�α� = GE𝑊𝑊�α� + GE𝐵𝐵(α), where GE𝑊𝑊(α) represents within-group, GE𝐵𝐵(α) represents between-group inequality.  GE𝑊𝑊�α� =
∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖GE𝑖𝑖�α�𝑖𝑖  and GE𝐵𝐵�α� = ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , with 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,GE𝑖𝑖, and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 representing group i’s income 
share, group i’s within-group inequality, and group i’s population share, respectively.   
 
  
81 
 
Table 2.21. Household CHIP income per capita by region and regional income gaps, 
with and without PPP adjustments, 2007 and 2013 
  2007 2013 
region/sector urban rural migrant all urban rural migrant all 
CHIP income per capita (yuan, current prices, no PPP adjustment) 
Eastern 25444 6896 16939 15574 37619  16042  22805  26764  
Central 15114 4160 11536 8514 25309  10629  21274  17606  
Western 13969 3273 12292 7107 26320  9556  21531  16774  
regional income ratios (no PPP adjustment) 
Eastern/Central 1.68 1.66 1.47 1.83 1.49  1.51  1.07  1.52  
Eastern/Western 1.82 2.11 1.38 2.19 1.43  1.68  1.06  1.60  
Central/Western 1.08 1.27 0.94 1.20 0.96  1.11  0.99  1.05  
regional income ratios (PPP adjusted) 
Eastern/Central 1.42 1.52 1.20 1.53 1.30  1.39  0.92  1.31  
Eastern/Western 1.49 1.92 1.11 1.80 1.23  1.63  0.89  1.39  
Central/Western 1.05 1.27 0.92 1.17 0.95  1.18  0.97  1.06  
Notes:  CHIP income per capita. The 2007 urban and rural samples each cover seven Eastern 
provinces (Beijing, Hebei (rural only), Liaoning, Shanghai (urban only), Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
and Guangdong), five Central provinces (Shanxi, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan), and four 
Western provinces (Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Gansu). The 2007 migrant sample covers 
the five largest migrant outflow provinces (three Central: Anhui, Henan, and Hubei; two Western: 
Chongqing and Sichuan), and the four largest migrant inflow provinces (all Eastern: Shanghai, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong).  The 2013 urban, rural, and migrant samples cover the same 
provinces: five Eastern (Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shandong, and Guangdong), five Central 
(Shanxi, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan), and five Western (Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, 
Gansu, and Xinjiang). 
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Table 2.22. Contribution of regional income gaps to national inequality (%) 
 No PPP adjustment With PPP adjustment 
 NBS income CHIP income NBS income CHIP income 
 2007 2013 2007 2013 2007 2013 2007 2013 
MLD 12.95 7.54 14.08 7.29 8.63 4.37 9.88 3.95 
Theil 13.84 8.16 15.03 7.72 9.12 4.69 10.48 4.14 
Notes:  For inequality indexes belonging to the general entropy class of indexes GE(α), as is 
the case for the MLD and Theil indexes (α = 0 for MLD and = 1 for the Theil), inequality 
between subgroups is as follows: GE�α� = GE𝑊𝑊�α�+ GE𝐵𝐵(α), where GE𝑊𝑊(α) represents 
within-group, GE𝐵𝐵(α) represents between-group inequality.  GE𝑊𝑊�α� = ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖GE𝑖𝑖�α�𝑖𝑖  and GE𝐵𝐵�α� = ∑ 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , with 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 ,GE𝑖𝑖 , and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  representing group i’s income share, group i’s 
within-group inequality, and group i’s population share, respectively.   
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Table 2.23. Gini coefficients for the eastern, central, and western Regions, 2007 and 
2013 
 no PPP adjustments with PPP adjustments 
 2007 2013 2007 2013 
Eastern 0.445 0.415 0.397 0.388 
Central 0.444 0.404 0.400 0.376 
Western 0.485 0.442 0.450 0.424 
National 0.486 0.433 0.431 0.400 
Note:  CHIP income per capita. 
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Table 2.24. The urban-rural income ratio for the eastern, central, and western regions, 
2007 and 2013 
 no PPP adjustment with PPP adjustment 
 2007 2013 2007 2013 
Eastern 3.27 2.06 2.30 1.51 
Central 3.51 2.32 2.69 1.80 
Western 4.17 2.64 3.27 2.20 
National 3.82 2.38 2.77 1.81 
Notes: CHIP income per capita.  Urban includes migrants.  The gaps are a bit larger but follow 
a similar pattern if migrants are not included in urban.  
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Table 2.25. Estimates of the national Gini coefficient incorporating the top-income 
group  
  2007 2013 2007 2013 2007 2013 
 Forbes Forbes Hurun Hurun Comb. Comb. 
Top income defined as > 120,000 yuan 
Gini including top incomes 0.488 0.523 0.497 0.575 0.502 0.630 
Ratio to Gini without top incomes 1.038 1.167 1.057 1.283 1.068 1.406 
Top income defined as > 60,000 yuan 
Gini including top incomes .483 .524 .494 .583 .501 .626 
Ratio to Gini without top incomes 1.028 1.170 1.051 1.301 1.066 1.397 
Top income defined as > highest income in the CHIP sample 
Gini including top incomes 0.485 0.492 0.491 0.521 0.494 0.553 
Ratio to Gini without top incomes 1.038 1.100 1.055 1.183 1.064 1.288 
Notes:  NBS income per capita; weights are applied to the CHIP sample data.  Ratios to 
the overall Gini without top incomes are calculated using the national Gini of NBS 
income per capita of .470 in 2007 and .448 in 2013 (Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.26. Change in the Gini coefficient from 2007 to 2013 (%) 
 
Forbes Hurun Combined 
Top income defined as income per capita 
greater than 120,000 yuan 7.2% 15.7% 25.5% 
Top income defined as income per capita 
greater than 60,000 yuan 8.5% 18.0% 25.0% 
Top income defined as income per capita 
greater than highest income in the CHIP 
sample 
1.0% 6.9% 15.4% 
Note:  NBS income per capita; weights applied to the CHIP sample data. 
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Table B2.1. OLS estimates of the Pareto distribution 
 Forbes Hurun Combined 
 log𝑙𝑙 α adj. R2 log𝑙𝑙 α adj. R2 log𝑙𝑙 α adj. R2 
2007 
28.946 
[114.07] 
1.294 
[92.93] 
0.9749 29.461 
[72.32] 
1.303 
[59.66] 
0.9740 30.161 
[168.52] 
1.341 
[136.14] 
0.9821 
2013 
35.278 
[158.02] 
1.595 
[135.02] 
0.9907 36.413 
[89.29] 
1.634 
[75.72] 
0.9822 38.124 
[259.47] 
1.725 
[219.18] 
0.9919 
Notes:  Estimated based on information from the Forbes, Hurun, and combined lists, assuming 
that top-income households contain two members (see the text).  t-statistics are reported in 
brackets; all estimates are significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table B2.2. Estimates of the population and distribution of income for the top-income 
group 
  2007 2013 2007 2013 2007 2013 
Top income defined as > 120,000 yuan Forbes Forbes Hurun Hurun Combined Comb. 
Top income population (million) 1.00 16.59 1.50 32.70 1.94 62.44 
Share of national population (%) 0.08 1.26 0.11 2.48 0.15 4.73 
Average income of top- income group (yuan) 528,657 321,681 516,040 309,274 471,906 285,517 
Inequality within the top-income group (Gini) 0.630 0.457 0.623 0.441 0.595 0.408 
Top income defined as > 60,000 yuan Forbes Forbes Hurun Hurun Comb. Comb. 
Top income population (million) 2.44 50.11 3.71 101.50 4.91 206.41 
Share of national population (%) 0.18 3.79 0.28 7.68 0.37 15.62 
Average income of top-income group (yuan) 264,328 160,840 258,020 154,637 235,953 142,759 
Inequality within the to- income group (Gini) .630 .457 .623 .441 .595 .408 
Top income defined as > highest income in the 
CHIP sample Forbes Forbes Hurun Hurun Comb. Comb. 
Top income population (million) 0.20 1.76 0.30 3.29 0.37 5.52 
Share of national population (%) 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.24 0.03 0.41 
Average income of top-income group (yuan) 1814350  1312821  1771048  1262190  1619582  1165233  
Inequality within the top-income group (Gini) 0.630 0.457 0.623 0.441 0.595 0.408 
Notes:  Estimated using equations (B.2) through (B.5) and data from the Forbes, Hurun, and 
combined lists.  
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Table B2.3. Incomes and inequality in the CHIP surveys 
 CHIP 2007 CHIP 2013 
Entire Samples 
Mean income 9,353 19,023 
Highest income 411,840 489,736 
Gini 0.470 0.448 
Excluding observations with incomes above 120,000 yuan 
Mean income 9,301 18,550 
Highest income 120,000 120,000 
Gini 0.467 0.437 
Excluding observations with incomes above 60,000 yuan 
Mean income 9,089 16,923 
Highest income 60,000 60,000 
Gini 0.458 0.407 
Notes:  NBS income per capita.  Calculated using CHIP data with weights.  The number of 
individuals in the sample with income per capita greater than or equal to 120,000 yuan was 18 in 
2007 and 130 in 2013, equivalent (with weights) to 0.02 percent and 0.29 percent of the 
population in each year, respectively.  The number of individuals in the sample with income per 
capita greater than or equal to 60,000 yuan was 313 in 2007 and 1,351 in 2013, equivalent (with 
weights) to 0.36 percent and 3.02 percent of the population in each year, respectively. 
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Table B2.4. Estimates of the Gini coefficient incorporating the top incomes with 
alternative household size assumptions and a threshold of 120,000 yuan 
  2007 2013 2007 2013 2007 2013 
 Forbes Forbes Hurun Hurun Comb. Comb. 
Gini including top incomes, top 
income household size = 1 
0.492 0.553 0.504 0.614 0.510 0.677 
Gini including top incomes, top 
income household size = 3 
0.491 0.525 0.499 0.554 0.504 0.601 
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Figure 2.1. National income per capita by income decile: Level and change, 2007 to 
2013 
Notes: CHIP income per capita.  Incomes and income growth are in constant 2007 prices, 
deflated using the NBS national average consumer price index, which showed an increase in the 
price level of 20.536 percent from 2007 to 2013. 
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Figure 2.2. National Lorenz curves, 2007 and 2013 
Notes: CHIP income per capita. The Lorenz curves for NBS income per capita are very similar. 
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Figure 2.3. Formal urban income per capita by income decile: Level and change, 
2007 to 2013 
Notes: CHIP income per capita, excluding migrants.  Incomes and income growth are in constant 
2007 prices, deflated using the NBS urban consumer price index.  
  
botto
m 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 top
2007 5463 8445 10604 12582 14629 17077 20115 24015 30285 48916
2013 5955 10997 14131 16930 20009 23349 27226 32370 40697 66975
real change % 9.0 30.2 33.3 34.6 36.8 36.7 35.4 34.8 34.4 36.9
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Figure 2.4. Lorenz curves for formal urban income per capita, 2007 and 2013 
       Note:  CHIP income per capita, excluding migrants. 
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Figure 2.5. Migrant income per capita by income decile: Level and change, 2007 to 
2013 
Notes:  CHIP income per capita. Incomes and income growth are in constant 2007 prices, 
deflated using the NBS urban consumer price index.   
  
bottom 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 top
2007 4000 7311 9147 10886 12114 14081 16078 18316 22229 38769
2013 4013 8040 10201 12449 14366 16647 19427 23550 29519 47673
real change % 0.3 10.0 11.5 14.4 18.6 18.2 20.8 28.6 32.8 23.0
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Figure 2.6. Lorenz curves for migrant income per capita, 2007 and 2013 
Note:  CHIP income per capita. 
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Figure 2.7. Rural income per capita by income decile: Level and change, 2007 to 
2013 
Notes:  CHIP income per capita. Incomes and income growth are in constant 2007 prices, 
deflated using the NBS rural consumer price index. 
  
bottom 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 top
2007 1085 1918 2455 2959 3504 4094 4835 5844 7476 13529
2013 1927 3575 4629 5677 6823 8185 9860 12153 15952 29875
real change % 77.6 86.4 88.5 91.8 94.7 99.9 103.9 108.0 113.4 120.8
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Figure 2.8. Lorenz curves for rural income per capita, 2007 and 2013 
Note:  CHIP income per capita. 
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Figure 2.9. Notional graph of the true income distribution 
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